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industry 
Kjell Hausken 
Abstract: Each of two firms has a resource that can be converted into safety versus 
productive investment in the first stage, with Bertrand competition on price in the 
second stage of a two-stage game. The firms produce differentiated products in a risky 
environment. If risks are negligible, investing more in safety decreases the price, and 
producing more increases the price. The results depend on whether risks get reduced 
concavely or convexly. With concave (convex) risk reduction, higher safety 
investment by the competitor causes higher (lower) own safety investment. With 
concave (convex) risk reduction, lower firm loyalty by consumers implies lower 
(higher) safety investment, higher product substitutability implies higher (lower) 
safety investment, and more adverse implications of the competitor’s productive 
investment on the demand intercept of the firm implies lower (higher) safety 
investment. When each firm independently maximises profit in a Nash equilibrium, 
safety investment is lower than when a social planner maximises social 
welfare and when maximising joint industry profits. The impact of the income, 
substitution, and interdependence effects on safety investment and price is finally 
analysed. 
Keywords: profit; safety; production; risk; accidents; competition; two-stage game; 
prices. 
1 Introduction 
Firms face risks due to internal factors related to production, equipment failure, human 
failure, due to interaction with other firms within the industry, or external factors. The 
latter can be societal changes in general, or targeted action such as crime, theft, 
espionage, hacking, blackmail, donation, terrorism. Firms maximise profits and often 
consider safety concerns as constraints imposed by law and regulations. This article takes 
the perspective that firms come equipped with resources, beyond sunk costs and fixed 
costs that can be converted into productive investment or safety investment. There is a 
tradeoff between the two. Too much productive investment increases the risk which may 
prove costly. Too much safety investment decreases the risk, but also decreases the profit, 
which may also prove costly. This article intends to understand the factors that affect the 
tradeoff, realising the multiple pathways from causes through intermediate effects and to 
ultimate effects. 
Asche and Aven (2004) discuss the hypothesis that safety and accident risk is in 
general not adequately incorporated into the economic planning and decision processes. 
They demonstrate ‘that safety measures have a value in an economic sense’, and consider 
‘the business incentives for investing into safety’, for one firm in isolation. This article 
analyses these incentives considering competition between two firms. To understand 
safety investment, firms need to be analysed in isolation, with externalities, and as 
strategically interacting with other firms. Accounting for strategic interaction between 
several firms usually generates insights that cannot be gained from one firm. The reason 
is that competition between firms may be strong or weak, products may be differentiated, 
externalities need to be modelled in a mutually dependent manner, production in one firm 
may affect one firm or cause differential risk on multiple firms, safety investment may 
benefit one firm or all firms in varying degrees, and incentives vary across firms. 
We analyse two firms producing differentiated products in a two-stage game. In the 
first stage the firms choose safety investment and thus productive investment, 
independently and simultaneously. In the second stage they choose prices independently, 
assuming Bertrand competition without collusion in the product market. Two stage 
models like this are common in the literatures on trade associations and joint ventures. 
Typically, information is shared in the first period, with Cournot or Betrand competition 
in the second stage. See e.g., Kirby (1988), Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Gal-Or 
and Ghose (2005), Shapiro (1986) and Vives (1990). 
To locate this research within a broader context, see Calow (1998), Fischhoff et al. 
(1981) and Jones-Lee (1989) for economic approaches to safety. Much literature focuses 
on public safety in a variety of senses. See Feber et al. (2003) for the economic effects of 
road safety improvements, Rienstra et al. (2000) for an economic evaluation of traffic 
safety measures for transport companies, and Swinbank (1993) for the economics of food 
safety. Some literature focuses on specific industries where safety concerns are 
prominent, in varying degrees affecting the public at large. See Thomas (1999) for 
economic and safety pressures on nuclear power, Rose (1990) for economic determinants 
of airline safety performance related to profitability and product quality, Ravi et al. 
(2002) for well safety and economics related to cement design in oil and gas production, 
and Kjellen et al. (1997) for economic effects of implementing internal control of health, 
safety and environment in an aluminium plant. 
Some literature balances safety and costs. Oi (1974, 1995) considers the economics of 
product safety, and which price is acceptable for safety, Kroger and Fischer’s (2000) 
balances safety and economics, and Gibson (1978) questions whether major hazards 
should be prevented at all costs. Further, see Hale (2000) for regulations of safety, Kotz 
and Schafer (1993) for economic incentives to accident prevention, Pape (1997) for the 
tolerability of risk in the application of ALARP, and Viscusi (1986, 1989, 1993) for 
safety through markets, market incentives for safety, and the value of risk to life and 
health. For a managerial review considering economic analysis as one of several inputs, 
see Aven (2003) and Hertz and Thomas (1983). Aven and Kørte (2003) consider the use 
of cost/benefit analyses and expected utility theory to support decision-making, Hausken 
(2002) merges game theory and probabilistic risk analysis, and Marcus et al. (1993) 
consider economic and behavioural perspectives on safety. 
Differing from most of the approaches above, this article takes one firm’s perspective 
in competition with another firm. A firm seeks to maximise profit, but has incentives to 
focus on safety due to the presence of risk. The risk is affected by both firms’ 
independent investments in safety versus production. The approach is intended to be 
useful for firms which implicitly, through complex decision making, need to make 
tradeoffs between safety and productive investment. There is a need to understand the 
factors that are influential. The article is also intended to be useful for regulators and 
policy makers who need to understand how firms think, or implicitly think. Finally the 
article is intended to be useful for the academic community which continuously strives to 
push the cutting edge research frontiers to enhance our insight into safety versus 
productive investments from a firm’s perspective. 
The article mainly considers risks that are present and are affected by strategic 
choices by the two firms, e.g., due to modes of production. However, we also briefly 
consider the risk impact of three external effects causing risky threats; the income, 
substitution, and interdependence effects. Such effects may be other firms, societal 
changes in general, or targeted action against one or both firms, e.g., crime or terrorism. 
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyses the model. Section 4 considers social 
welfare and joint industry profits. Section 5 assumes sequential entry. Section 6 considers 
the income, substitution, and interdependence effects. Section 7 concludes. 
2 The model 
Consider a market of two firms with resources Ri and Rj, i, j = 1, 2, i ≠ j, which may be 
capital goods or labour. Resource Ri can be converted into productive investment ti, at 
unit conversion cost ci, and safety investment si, at unit conversion cost di, 
, 1, 2i i i i iR c t d s i= + = (1)
Each firm produces a differentiated product in a two-stage non-cooperative game. As a 
practical aid it may be convenient to think of a product as a consumption good such as 
oil, and the resource Ri as a capital good such as oil drilling equipment. Alternatively, the 
product may be a consumption good such as fish, and the resource Ri a capital good such 
as fishing nets. In the first stage, the firms simultaneously and independently choose 
optimal levels of safety investments si and sj, which are inserted into (1) to yield optimal 
productive investments ti and tj. In the second stage, they choose prices pi and pj 
simultaneously and independently. We apply backward induction to determine the 
subgame perfect equilibrium, which is a Bertrand-Nash solution since the firms compete 
choosing prices. 
The demand qi facing each product is 
1 2 2 1, 0i i i j iq a b p b p B b b= − + + ≤ < (2)
as suggested by, e.g., McGuire and Staelin (1983). Assuming linearity in self and 
cross-price effects, b1 measures how price sensitive consumers are to firm i’s product, 
which reduces demand qi, and b2 measures product substitutability, which increases 
demand qi. That is, b1 = b2 means homogenous products, and b2 = 0 means two 
monopolists. The initial intercept of demand is ai for firm i, and Bi is the potential shift in 
the demand. The quantity qi demanded from firm i increases with firm i’s productive 
investment ti, and decreases with firm j’s productive investment αtj, where 0 ≤ α < 1 
expresses that own effects exceed cross effects. The quantity qi decreases with the risk 
ri = ri(si, sj) of accidents, which is the probability vi of accidents times the magnitude m, 
that is ri = vim. We thus define 
i i j iB t t rα= − − (3)
3 Analysing the model 
Firm i’s profit function is 
( )1 2i i i i i i j i j ip q p a b p b p t t rαΠ = = − + + − −  (4)
where we have inserted (2) and (3). The Appendix determines the second stage 
equilibrium price 
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Substituting the second stage price into the profit function and differentiating with respect 
to the first stage decision variables gives a profit function and first order condition, 
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Without risk ri = rj = 0, firm i invests ti = Ri / ci in production, zero in safety, enjoying 
maximum price and profit. With risk, setting the first order condition in (A2) equal to 
zero gives 
Proposition 1 For two firms with independent risks defined s.t. ∂ri / ∂sj = 0, the 
optimal level si of safety investment is given by 
( ) ( )1 2 12 2 0i i i ir s b b d c bα∂ ∂ = − − <⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ (7)
The inequality follows since we always have 2b1 – b2α > 0 since 0 ≤ b2 < b1 and 
0 ≤ α < 1. We assume that the inequality holds generally. It means that increased 
productive investment increases the risk, and safety investment decreases the risk. 
Proposition 2 For two firms with interdependent risks defined s.t. ∂ri / ∂sj < 0, the 
optimal level si of safety investment is given by 
( ) ( )1 2 2 12 2i i i i j ir s b b d c b r s bα⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ = − − − ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ (8)
Proposition 2 causes ∂ri / ∂si to be larger (less negative) than in Proposition 1. This means 
that if the other firm’s safety investment reduces one’s own risk, then one’s own safety 
investment has less impact on one’s risk. Inserting the optimal si in Propositions 1 and 2 
into (4) and (5) applying (1) for ti, gives the price and profit. 
Applying (A2) gives the following comparative statics. 
Proposition 3 
1 A firm’s price decreases in own safety investment if the impact on risks is small. If 
the impact on risks is sufficiently negative and di / ci is small, then the price 
increases. 
2 A firm’s price decreases in the competitor’s safety investment if α < b2 / (2b1) and 
there is no impact on risks. If the impact on risks is sufficiently negative and dj / cj is 
small, then the price increases. 
This means that if risks are negligible, investing more in safety decreases the price, and 
producing more increases the price. Conversely, if risks are affected sufficiently by both 
safety and productive investment, investing more in safety increases the price, and 
producing more decreases the price. 
Let us first consider the favourable case where own productive investment has no 
impact on the risks of the two firms. Then the price always increases in own productive 
investment, and it increases more if consumers are price sensitive or disloyal to firm i’s 
product (b1 is large) if product substitutability is low (b2 is low) and if own effects of 
investment on demand exceed cross effects considerably (α is low). If own productive 
investment has sufficiently large impact on the risks of one or both firms, then the price 
decreases. Especially the impact on one’s own risk contributes to reducing the price. 
The ratio of the unit conversion costs di / ci of safety investments boosts 2b1 – b2α in 
the numerator of (A2) which has a negative impact on price. When the cost di of safety 
investment is large, the impact on price is negative, and positive if di is small. Ensuring a 
price increase through the other firm’s productive investment is more difficult, though it 
is possible if 2b1α – b2 < 0 and there is no impact on risks. If the requirement is not 
satisfied, or if the impact on risks is sufficiently large, then the price decreases. 
To determine how the firms react to each other’s productive and safety investments, 
we must consider the second derivatives. We assume 
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The first inequality assumes that since ∂ri / ∂si < 0 and ∂rj / ∂sj < 0, intensified safety 
investment by both firms reduces the marginal impact, causing a positive second cross 
derivative. The second expression assumes that the joint operation of increased safety and 
productive investment within one firm cancel each other out, causing zero impact on risk. 
Our second assumption A2I assumes that safety investment reduces risk in an 
increasingly beneficial and convex manner, 
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which means that low investments have low impact on risks. High safety investment is 
needed to constrain the risk, and then the risk is constrained dramatically. This is 
likely with simple technology or when limited competence is needed for production. 
Safety measures may then quickly exceed essential thresholds and cause beneficial 
results. Similarly, high production causes a dramatic increase in risk, e.g., due to 
deleterious ripple effects with larger volumes, higher complexity, and more activity. 
Our alternative second assumption A2D assumes that safety investment reduces risk 
in a decreasingly beneficial and concave manner, 
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which means that low investments have high impact on risks. As safety investment 
increases, there is diminishing return, e.g., because opportunities for safety are low. Some 
risk phenomena may be such that these are hard to regulate or control, regardless how 
much resources and effort are invested. Similarly, increasing production impacts risk 
diminishingly. A2D applies in simple production plants with low complexity where 
modest safety measures are all that is needed, and where large production volumes can be 
implemented with modest risk exposure. 
Proposition 4 
1 With increasing risk return on safety investment (A1 and A2I) higher safety 
investment by the competitor causes higher own safety investment. The reaction 
functions are upward sloping, ∂si / ∂sj > 0. 
2 With decreasing risk return on safety investment (A1 and A2D) higher safety 
investment by the competitor causes lower own safety investment. The reaction 
functions are downward sloping, ∂si / ∂sj < 0. 
Proposition 4 is illustrated in Table 1, where sj↑ means that sj increases, and ti↓ means 
that ti decreases. Note that the diagonal elements are equivalent. 
Table 1 Illustration of Proposition 4 
Own firm 
A1 and A2I A1 and A2D 
sj↑ si↑, ti↓ si↓, ti↑ Competitor 
tj↑ si↓, ti↑ si↑, ti↓ 
Summing up, with increasing risk return on investment, the two firms’ safety investments 
reinforce each other, and the two firms’ productive investments reinforce each other. 
Conversely, with decreasing risk return on investment, the two firms’ safety investments 
work in the opposite direction, and the two firms’ productive investments work in the 
opposite direction. 
Proposition 5 
1 lower firm loyalty (higher b1) implies lower safety investment ∂si / ∂b1 < 0 when A2I 
and ∂ri / ∂si << 0 
2 conversely, lower firm loyalty implies higher safety investment ∂si / ∂b1 > 0 when 
A2D and ∂ri / ∂si << 0. 
A steeper demand schedule b1 means a lower level of demand at a given price, which 
means lower firm loyalty. Assume substantial impact of safety investment on risk 
reduction, ∂ri / ∂si << 0. When safety investment reduces risk in an increasingly 
beneficial and convex manner, 2 2/ 0,i ir s∂ ∂ <  firm i invests less in safety. This seems due 
to a cashing in effect. Investment in safety has such substantial impact that resources can 
be converted into production instead. Conversely, when 2 2/ 0,i ir s∂ ∂ <  firm i invests 
more in safety. The decreasingly beneficial impact of safety investment implies that 
firm i must take on the burden of investing in safety to satisfy the safety concerns. 
Proposition 6 
1 higher product substitutability (higher b2) implies higher safety investment  
∂si / ∂b2 > 0 when A2I and ∂ri / ∂si << 0 
2 conversely, lower product substitutability implies lower safety investment  
∂si / ∂b2 < 0 when A2D and ∂ri / ∂si << 0. 
Higher product substitutability causes more competition between the two firms. Assume 
again substantial impact of safety investment on risk reduction, ∂ri / ∂si << 0, which 
causes ∂pi / ∂si > 0. When safety investment reduces risk in an increasingly beneficial and 
convex manner, 2 2/ 0,i ir s∂ ∂ <  firm i invests more in safety, and less in production. 
Conversely, when safety investment reduces risk in a decreasingly beneficial and concave 
manner, 2 2/ 0,i ir s∂ ∂ <  firm i invests less in safety. 
Proposition 7 
1 higher α implies lower safety investment ∂si / ∂α < 0 when A2I and ∂ri / ∂si << 0 
2 conversely, higher α implies higher safety investment ∂si / ∂α > 0 when A2D and  
∂ri / ∂si << 0. 
The parameter α measures the adverse implications of the competitor’s productive 
investment on the demand intercept of firm i. Higher α implies lower volumes of sales. 
Assume substantial impact of safety investment on risk reduction, ∂ri / ∂si << 0, which 
causes ∂pi / ∂si > 0. When safety investment reduces risk in an increasingly beneficial and 
convex manner, 2 2/ 0,i ir s∂ ∂ <  firm i invests less in safety, which seems due to a cashing 
in effect. Resources are converted into production instead. Conversely, when safety 
investment reduces risk in a decreasingly beneficial and concave manner, 2 2/ 0,i ir s∂ ∂ <  
firm i invests more in safety. 
Proposition 8 Safety and productive investments have no impact on the initial 
intercept ai of demand for firm i, interpreted as firm size, ∂si / ∂ai = 0. 
4 Social welfare and joint industry profits 
Introducing a social planner, we derive the inverse demand function s.t. pi = Fi (qi, qj), 
and assume symmetry s.t. subscripts can be removed. We define social welfare as 
* *
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Applying (3) and (5) at the symmetric equilibrium gives  
q* = b1p* = b1 (a + B) / (2b1 – b2) and ∂q* / ∂s = (∂B + ∂s) b1 / (2b1 – b2). Applying 
Leibniz’s Theorem gives 
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Inserting t = (R – ds) / c, ∂B / ∂s = 0, and ∂r / ∂si = ∂r / ∂sj = ∂r / ∂s when symmetry gives 
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For productive investment we analogously get 
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When maximising joint industry profits without price coordination, prices are 
p* = (a + B) / (2b1 – b2) and joint industry profits according to (6) are 
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Hence maximising joint industry profits gives the same result as maximising social 
welfare. 
When each firm maximises profit, (6), (A2), ∂pi / ∂si = 0, and symmetry imply 
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Equations (6), (A2), ∂pi / ∂si = 0, and symmetry analogously imply 
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Proposition 9 When each firm independently maximises profit in a Nash equilibrium, 
safety investment is lower than when a social planner maximises social 
welfare, which gives the same result as when maximising joint industry 
profits, (∂r / ∂s)NE < (∂r / ∂s)SW ⇒ sNE < sSW. 
5 Sequential entry 
Consider a three stage game. In stage 1 the leader incumbent firm i chooses si, which 
determines ti from (1). In stage 2 the follower entrant firm j chooses sj. In stage 3 both 
firms choose prices pi and pj. Stage 3 has the same solution as stage 2 in Section 3, and 
stage 2 for firm j has the same first order condition as (6). The first order condition for 
firm i is 
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Applying (A2) and Proposition 3 give 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
0 when 2 and 2 / 2 / / 0
0 when 2 and 2 / 2 / / 0
0 when 2 and 2 / 2 / / 0
0 when 2 and 2 / 2 / / 0
j j i j j j
j j i j j jji
j i j j i j j j
j j i j j j
A I b b d c b r s b r s
A I b b d c b r s b r ssp
s s A D b b d c b r s b r s
A D b b d c b r s b r s
α
α
α
α
> − − ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ >
< − − ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ <∂∂
∂ ∂ < − − ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ >
> − − ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ <
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
 (20) 
Proposition 10 
1 for those cases in (20) where (∂pi / ∂sj) (∂sj / ∂sj) > 0, safety investments si and sj are 
larger for sequential entry than in the simultaneous game 
2 conversely, when (∂pi / ∂sj) (∂sj / ∂sj) < 0, safety investments si and sj are smaller for 
sequential entry than in the simultaneous game. 
Consider the first line in (20) which applies when safety investment reduces risk in an 
increasingly beneficial and convex manner, and when ∂rj / ∂sj << 0. In this case safety 
investments si and sj are larger for sequential entry than in the simultaneous game. 
6 Income effect, substitution effect, and interdependence effect 
We have so far assumed that risks are present and affected by strategic choices by the two 
firms, e.g., due to modes of production. In this last section, we briefly consider the risk 
impact of three external effects, please see Hausken (2006). Such effects causing risky 
threats may be other firms, societal changes in general, or targeted action against one or 
both firms. Examples are crime, theft, espionage, hacking, blackmail, donation, terrorism. 
We first consider the income effect. Enders and Sandler (2003) show how ‘freezing 
terrorist’s assets reduces their income. A firm’s safety investment may be passive 
defensive mechanisms, or active offensive mechanisms designed for eliminating or 
deterring some or all external risks, which may benefit one or both firms. This causes 
∂ri / ∂si and ∂ri / ∂sj to be more negative than before since safety eliminates or deters part 
of the external threat. This causes ∂pi / ∂si to be larger according to (A2). We also assume 
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We second consider the substitution effect. Enders and Sandler (2003) show how ‘the 
installation of screening devices in US airports in January 1973 made skyjackings more 
difficult, thus encouraging terrorists to substitute into other kinds of hostage missions or 
to stage a skyjacking from an airport outside of the USA. This causes ∂ri / ∂sj to be less 
negative than before, and may be positive, since safety investment by the other firm 
makes one’s own firm more liable to the external threat. This causes ∂pi / ∂si to be 
smaller according to (A2). ∂ri / ∂ti is more positive than before since productive 
investment makes one’s own firm more liable to the external threat. We also assume 
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We third consider the interdependence effect, considered by Kunreuther and Heal (2003) 
exemplified within the airline industry, computer networks, fire protection, theft 
protection, bankruptcy protection, vaccinations. In varying degrees, one target’s safety 
investment benefits all targets. This causes ∂ri / ∂sj to be more negative than before since 
safety investment by the other firm benefits one’s own firm increasingly. This causes ∂pi 
/ ∂si to be larger according to (A2). ∂ri / ∂tj is more positive than before since productive 
investment by the other firm increases one’s own risk increasingly. We also assume 
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Table 2 Income, substitution, and interdependence effects 
Effect ∂ri / ∂si ∂ri / ∂sj ∂pi / ∂si 
Income More negative More negative Larger 
Substitution Less negative, or positive Smaller 
Interdependence More negative Larger
7 Conclusions 
The article analyses two firms which produce differentiated products in a risky 
environment and compete on price to maximise profit. Each firm has a resource that be 
converted into safety versus productive investment. The tradeoff depends on a variety of 
factors which this article intends to understand and illuminate. Choosing the firm’s 
perspective and incentives for safety investment is essential since many of today’s 
societal mechanisms are generated by the interests of firms. Firms’ incentives have 
received modest attention in earlier research compared, e.g., by the perspective that safety 
concerns are constraints imposed by law and regulations which are often designed from a 
societal perspective. Both perspectives are needed. 
If risks are negligible, the article shows that investing more in safety decreases the 
price, and producing more increases the price. Conversely, if risks are affected 
sufficiently by both safety and productive investment, safety investment is cheap, and 
production is expensive, then investing more in safety increases the price, and producing 
more decreases the price. 
Although risks get reduced by safety investment, the results of the article depend 
strongly on whether risks get reduced concavely (increasingly beneficial) or convexly 
(decreasingly beneficial). The former is likely with simple technology or when limited 
competence is needed for production. As safety measures exceed certain limits, beneficial 
results may quickly follow. The latter is likely for risk phenomena that are hard to 
regulate or control, and when opportunities for safety are low, regardless how much 
resources and effort are invested. 
With concave (convex) risk reduction, higher safety investment by the competitor 
causes higher (lower) own safety investment. Three results follow for the case that risks 
are substantially reduced by safety investment. With concave (convex) risk reduction, 
lower firm loyalty by consumers implies lower (higher) safety investment, higher product 
substitutability implies higher (lower) safety investment, and more adverse implications 
of the competitor’s productive investment on the demand intercept of the firm implies 
lower (higher) safety investment. 
Safety and productive investments have no impact on the initial intercept of demand 
for a firm, interpreted as firm size. We show that when each firm independently 
maximises profit in a Nash equilibrium, safety investment is lower than when a social 
planner maximises social welfare, which gives the same result as when maximising joint 
industry profits. The article also considers the case of sequential entry. 
The main results of the article apply for risks that are present and affected by strategic 
choices by the two firms, e.g., due to modes of production. The last section briefly 
considers the risk impact of three external effects, e.g., crime or terrorism targeting one or 
both firms. The income effect, where safety investment by one or both firms reduce the 
externally generated risk, causes safety investment to have more impact, and the price 
increases. The substitution effect causes safety investment by the other firm to make 
one’s own firm more liable to the external threat, which reduces the price of one’s own 
product. The interdependence effect causes safety investment by the other firm to benefit 
both firms, which increases the price. 
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Appendix 
We first solve the second stage for price. Setting the derivative of (4) with respect to pi 
equal to zero gives 
( ) ( )2 1 12i i j i j i ip a b p t t r b q bα= + + − − =  (A1)
Interchanging i and j and solving the two price reaction functions gives (5). Inserting 
from (1) that ti = (Ri – disi) / ci and tj = (Rj – djsj) / cj, and differentiating gives 
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Proof of Proposition 4 
The second derivatives are as follows, inserting the assumptions A1, A2I, A2D: 
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Applying the implicit function approach, total differentiation of (6) gives 
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which are solved to yield 
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where the assumptions are inserted. 
Proof of Proposition 5 for b1 
We first determine 
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Applying the implicit function approach, total differentiation of (6) gives 
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where the assumptions are inserted. 
Proof of Proposition 6 for b2 
We first determine 
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Applying the implicit function approach, total differentiation of (6) gives 
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where the assumptions are inserted. 
Proof of Proposition 7 for α 
We first determine 
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Applying the implicit function approach, total differentiation of (6) gives 
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where the assumptions are inserted. 
Proof of Proposition 8 for ai 
Applying the implicit function approach, total differentiation of (6) gives 
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where the assumptions are inserted. Differentiation of (6) and inserting 
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